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INTRODUCTION
The convicted sex offender is perhaps the most despised and
unsympathetic member of American society; and specifically those
convicted of crimes against children are considered the vilest. The
societal view of sex offenders is best exemplified by the words of
Justice Kennedy in McKune v. Lile, where he succinctly stated: “Sex
offenders are a serious threat in this Nation.”1 This view spans the
continuum from the most respected jurist to the average person. It
stems from the fact that these offenders harm children and other
vulnerable persons.2 It also stems from the belief that since sex
offenders are released back into society, they are more likely than
other criminals to re-offend.3 This societal view also makes it easier
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
536 U.S. 24, 32 (2002) (holding that sexual abuse treatment program for
prison inmates did not amount compelled self-incrimination).
2
See id.
3
Id.; but see ERIC LOTKE, NAT’L CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS AND
ALTERNATIVES, INC., SEX OFFENSES: FACTS, FICTIONS, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2
(2006), available at http://66.165.94.98/stories/SexOffendersReport.pdf (noting that
“[r]ecidivism rates are relatively low, typically running in the 3- 13% range, and
among the lowest of all types of crimes”).
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for legislatures to justify regulations against sex offenders as
communities look for ways to reduce the frequency and severity of sex
crimes.4
In the name of public safety, localities require sex offenders to
not only publicly classify themselves but also restrict where sex
offenders may live and what public spaces sex offenders may enter
and enjoy.5 These restrictions against sex offenders pass without
opposition, garner support from the community, and when challenged
in court are uniformly upheld.6 Not only do the courts dismiss any and
all constitutional arguments, but they also allude to the fact that any
restriction against sex offenders would pass rational basis review for
the safety of children is always a legitimate interest.7
In September 2006, the United States Circuit Court for the
Seventh Circuit entertained Brown v. Michigan City, which dealt with
the “rights” of sex offenders and upheld a law directed at a sex
offender.8 The Seventh Circuit did not stray from the path set by
previous courts and may even have gone a step further, upholding an
ordinance which bans a specific individual from entering public
parks.9 In upholding this ordinance, the Seventh Circuit has aided the
general trend to strip convicted sex offenders of their rights.
Part I focuses on the background of Brown v. Michigan City
including the facts and reasoning behind the decision as well as the
4

See LOTKE, supra note 3, at 1.
See Richard R. Whidden Jr. and Tiffany A. Richards, Local Government
Regulation of Sex Offenders: Addressing a Threat, (2006),
http://www.nationallawcenter.org/news/news/nlc-publishes-article-on-local-sexoffender-laws.html (stating that fourteen states have enacted residence restrictions
and three communities have enacted ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from
visiting parks). See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005)
6
Patrick Whitnell, Legal Notes: Coping with the Paroled Sex Offender Next
Door, (2006), http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?zone=wcm&previewStory=24692#
7
See, e.g., McKune, 536 U.S. at 33. (stating in regards to Kansas’ Sexual
Abuse Treatment Program, “[s]tates thus have a vital interest in rehabilitating
convicted sex offenders”).
8
462 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2006).
9
Id.
5
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history of regulations against sex offenders and their constitutionality
as decided by both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court. Part II
analyzes the decision made by the Seventh Circuit in Brown v.
Michigan City. It examines the Seventh Circuit’s decision and finds
that the deferential use of the rational basis standard of review is
flawed. If rational basis review is used for each and every sex offender
law, then any restriction placed on sex offenders will be deemed
constitutional. This places sex offenders in a unique situation, although
they are released back into society they do not have the same rights as
any other citizen and any law which passes rational basis review can
strip them of even more rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brown v. Michigan City: The Facts
In 1995, Mr. Brown was convicted of one count of child
molestation.10 He was sentenced to six years in prison with three years
suspended.11 After his release, in 1999, Mr. Brown was placed on
probation for the remaining three years and completed court-required
counseling.12 Between 1995 and 2002, Mr. Brown complied with sex
offender laws to the best of his knowledge and had no arrests.13 Each
day during that time span Mr. Brown did, however, frequent
Washington Park.14
Washington Park is a large public park located on Lake
Michigan.15 Residents may enter Washington Park with a resident
pass.16 Mr. Brown began visiting Washington Park on a daily basis

10

Id. at 723.
Id. at 723 n.3.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 724.
14
Id. at 722.
15
Id.
16
Id.
11
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with his wife in 1988.17 When they visited the park, they would,
according to Mr. Brown, “sit and watch the sunsets and sunrises, drink
coffee, [and] smoke cigarettes.”18 After his wife’s death, Mr. Brown
continued this daily ritual.19 Over the course of approximately fourteen
years, Mr. Brown would drive to Washington Park, park by the lake,
drink coffee, and smoke cigarettes.20 For the most part, he did not
leave his vehicle.21
In 2002, the Michigan City Department of Parks became aware of
Mr. Brown, when he had been observed at Stone Lake Beach in
LaPorte, Indiana, watching beach patrons with binoculars.22 An
investigation by the LaPorte police discovered that Mr. Brown was a
convicted sex offender.23 Subsequently, the LaPorte Recreation
Director informed the Michigan City Police Department of Mr.
Brown.24 The City admits that, while Mr. Brown’s daily activities were
innocent, combined with his conviction of child molestation, his
activities raised a “red flag.”25 With this knowledge, police approached
Mr. Brown in Washington Park on four separate occasions.26 On the
fourth occasion, a city attorney informed Mr. Brown that he was no
longer allowed in the park.27 Mr. Brown complied with this order and
never re-entered Washington Park.28
17

Id.
Id. (quoting Brown’s deposition testimony).
19
Id. at 722.
20
Id. Mr. Brown would also “watch people at the beach, sometimes with
binoculars.” Id. at 722 n.1. While Mr. Brown claims he only watched women on the
beach, the city council alleges that he watched children and that the “women” he was
watching were actually teenage girls. Id.
21
Id. at 722
22
Id. at 723.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. (quoting Recreation Director Garbacik’s deposition testimony).
26
Id. at 723- 24.
27
Id. at 724.
28
Id.
18
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On July 31, 2002, the Michigan City Parks and Recreation Board
informed Mr. Brown of a meeting at the Park Office, located in
Washington Park, at which the Board would discuss the banning of
Mr. Brown from Michigan City Park properties.29 Mr. Brown did not
attend the meeting.30 On August 1, 2002, the Michigan City Parks and
Recreation Board convened, and a Park Department attorney presented
Resolution 548, entitled “A Resolution Prohibiting the Use of Park
Department Properties by an Individual Having a Child Molesting
History.” 31
29

Id.
Id. Mr. Brown testified in his deposition that he understood that he was
invited to attend the meeting at the Park Office inside Washington Park but that he
had been told by police never to re-enter the park. Id. A friend of Mr. Brown spoke
with the Park Superintendent to determine if Mr. Brown could attend the meeting. Id.
He received oral confirmation that Mr. Brown could attend without being arrested,
but the superintendent and the city attorney refused to put this assurance in writing.
Id.
31
Id. at 724-25. The resolution provided:
WHEREAS, it was brought to the attention of this Board by the
Department staff and the Michigan City Police Department that
during the period of a recent summer day camp program for
children conducted at Washington Park, an individual, namely,
Robert E. Brown . . ., who was recognized by members of the
Michigan City Police force as a convicted child molester, was
observed by the Police and the Department staff frequenting
Washington Park in [a] recreational/camping vehicle, while having
a set of binoculars and a camera in his possession, and
WHEREAS, this Board has determined that in order to discharge
its responsibilities of child protection and safety, it is necessary to
designate all properties and programs under the jurisdiction of the
Department to be OFF LIMITS to any person who has been
convicted of child molesting under Indiana Code, IC 35-42-4-3, or
convicted of any other sex crime in which the victim is a child
under the age of 18 years, and to ban such person from all
Michigan City Parks and Recreation Department properties
indefinitely.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE MICHIGAN
CITY PARKS AND RECREATION BOARD AS FOLLOWS:
(1) That ROBERT E. BROWN . . . is hereby BANNED from all
properties or programs operated under the jurisdiction of the
30
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In presenting Resolution 548, the Park Department attorney
explained that Mr. Brown had been involved in a “series of incidents
. . . involving the safety and protection of children,” had been
convicted of child molestation, and had been engaged in suspicious
activity at Washington Park.32 Mr. Brown’s activities included visiting
the park everyday, on one occasion watching people with binoculars
and a camera, and on numerous occasions driving slowly by a
children’s day camp located in the Park.33 The attorney stressed that
the Board was responsible for the “care, custody, and safety of
[children who visit the park].”34 The Board unanimously passed the
Resolution.35
After Mr. Brown commenced litigation, in August 2002, the
Board reconvened for a special session without notifying Mr. Brown.36
At the session the Board rescinded Resolution 548 and passed in its
stead Resolution 552, entitled “A Resolution Prohibiting the Use of
Park Department Properties by an Individual Having a Child
Molesting History, Whose Observed Behavior Constitutes a Threat to
the Safety of Children.”37 Resolution 552 is substantially similar to its
predecessor except that rather than making the park properties “OFF
Michigan City Department of Parks and Recreation and that in the
event said individual is found upon any such property, he shall be
considered a trespasser, and shall be removed forthwith, or be
subject to arrest for failure to depart the premises.
(2) That all properties and programs operated under the jurisdiction
of this Department are hereby declared OFF LIMITS to any person
who has been convicted of child molesting under Indiana Code, IC
35-42-4-3, or convicted of any other sex crime in which the victim
is a child under the age of 18 years, and in the event that such
individual is identified and found upon any such property, he shall
be considered a trespasser and shall be ordered to remove himself
forthwith, or be subject to arrest for failure to depart the premises.
32
Id. at 725.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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LIMITS to any person who has been convicted of child molesting
under Indiana Code, IC 35-42-4-3, or convicted of any other sex crime
in which the victim is a child under the age of 18 years,” Resolution
552 makes the Michigan City Parks “OFF LIMITS to the said Mr.
Robert E. Brown who has been convicted of child molesting under
Indiana Code, IC 35-42-4-3, and whose observed behavior in
Washington Park is deemed by this Board to constitute a threat to the
safety of children.”38
The Park attorney explained at the meeting that the proposed
change was necessary to prevent Mr. Brown from a successful motion
for class certification.39 The attorney stated: “Resolution No. 548 must
be ‘narrowly tailored’ and it is ‘narrowly tailored’ if it targets and
eliminates no more tha[n] the exact source of evil it seeks to
remedy.”40 The Park Board unanimously voted to rescind Resolution
548 and to adopt Resolution 552.41
B. Brown v. Michigan: The Decision
Mr. Brown attacked Resolution 552 on three separate
constitutional grounds.42 He claimed that this ordinance violates his
substantive property interest in the Michigan City Parks and his
substantive liberty interest based upon damage to his reputation, and
that the application of this resolution violated his procedural due
process rights.43
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana dismissed each of these claims and granted summary judgment
in favor of Michigan City.44 It held that Mr. Brown had neither a
38

Id. at 725-26 (emphasis added).
Id. at 726.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Brown v. Michigan City, No. 3:02 CV 572 RM, 2005 WL 2281502, at *12
(N.D. Ind. 2005).
39
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protected property interest to enter a public park nor a protected liberty
interest in his reputation to demand due process protections.45 It also
stated that although the right of access to a public park may be
important, it is not fundamental.46 The district court further found that
the ban was rationally related to the compelling interest of protecting
children, noting that Michigan City was not “bound to wait until Mr.
[Brown] again committed child molestation or attempted child
molestation in order to act.”47 Finally, the district court inquired as to
whether this ban was an arbitrary exercise of power.48 It reasoned that
the ban was not an arbitrary exercise of power as the ban did not
“shock the contemporary conscience.”49
The Seventh Circuit50 affirmed the district court’s opinion and
held that the Michigan City Park Ordinance violated neither
substantive due process nor procedural due process.51 The court
reasoned that Mr. Brown is not entitled to a constitutional property
interest in the public parks, that Mr. Brown failed to demonstrate he
was deprived of a valid liberty interest, and that, because no valid
property or liberty interest was involved, it was not necessary to
analyze what process was due to Mr. Brown.52
1. Substantive Due Process
The Seventh Circuit held that, according to the United States
Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg,53 there is only a narrow
category of fundamental rights—“the rights to marry, to have children,
to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital
45

Id. at *5-7.
Id. at *11.
47
Id. at *12 (quoting Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767 n.8).
48
Brown, 2005 WL 2281502, at *12.
49
Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998).
50
The panel consisted of Judges Ripple, Manion, and Kanne.
51
Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2006).
52
Id. at 729-32.
53
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
46
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privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.”54
The court found that the right to enter a public park is not contained in
this narrow list and that the list should not be expanded to include it.55
Further, the court found that the ban of Mr. Brown was rationally
related to the goal of protecting the children of the community and
thus passes rational basis review.56
2. Procedural Due Process
To determine whether Resolution 522 violated procedural due
process the Seventh Circuit first analyzed whether Mr. Brown was
deprived of a protected interest and whether process was due.57 The
court relied on the framework propounded by the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge58 focusing on factors such as the private interest
affected by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such an interest, and the probable value of procedural safeguards.59
The court reasoned that for there to be a property interest an
individual must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.60 The court
found that the distribution of park passes to residents did not create a
legitimate interest in visiting the park.61 Accordingly, the Constitution
does not guarantee access to Washington Park.62 Further, the court
reasoned that for Michigan City to have implicated a liberty interest,
the ordinance needed to not only defame Mr. Brown but also to alter
his legal status, such as depriving him of a right.63 The court found
54

Brown, 462 F.3d at 732 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720) (noting that
there may also be a right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment).
55
Brown, 462 F.3d at 732.
56
Id. at 734.
57
Id. at 728.
58
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
59
Brown, 462 F.3d at 728.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 729.
63
Id. at 730 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
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that Mr. Brown’s claims did not satisfy these requirements, because he
could not establish that he had a right to enter the public park.64
For Mr. Brown’s procedural due process claims, the court held
that Mr. Brown was neither deprived of a property interest or a liberty
interest, and accordingly did not need to determine whether Mr. Brown
received adequate process.65
C. Regulating Sex Offenders
The term “sex offender” has two broad definitions. A sex offender
can be:
[A]ny person who willfully and lewdly commits any
lewd or lascivious act, upon or with the body, or any
part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age
of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that
person or the child.66
Or, a sex offender can be defined as “any person who commits an act
by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person.”67

64

Brown, 462 F.3d at 731.
Id.
66
MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, CAL. STATE LIBRARY, THE IMPACT OF
RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2006), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06-008.pdf (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a)
(West 2005)). In Indiana, a sex offender is an individual who has been convicted of
any of the following offenses or has attempted to commit any of the following
offenses: rape, criminal deviate conduct, child molesting, child exploitation,
vicarious sexual gratification, child solicitation, child seduction, sexual misconduct
with a minor, incest, sexual battery, kidnapping if the victim is less than 18, criminal
confinement if the victim is less than 18, and possession of child pornography. IC
11-8-8-5.
67
NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 1 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(b)(1)).
65
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In a given year, there are 60,000 to 70,000 arrests for child sexual
assault and 15,000 to 20,000 arrests for rape.68 Child molesters are
likely to recidivate at a rate of 12.7%, whereas rapists have a
recidivism rate of 18.9%.69 Currently, there are an estimated 550,000
registered sex offenders in this country.70 Because of this large number
and the belief that sexual offenders are more likely to be repeat
offenders, legislatures use a variety of policies to protect the public
against sex offenders.71 Specifically, sex offender legislation is
intended to prevent the occurrence of sex offenses.72
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Act which
requires sex offender registration.73 Two years later, Congress enacted
68

NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 1 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME CHARACTERISTICS: VICTIM/OFFENDER RELATIONSHIP
(2004)).
69
NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 2.
70
Id.
71
See LOTKE, supra note 3, at 2; but see id. at 2-3 (citing to Solicitor General
of Canada Karl Hanson’s 2004 study finding that the overall recidivism rate for new
sex crimes is 13.7%, the recidivism rate for child molestation is 12.7%, the
recidivism rate for child molestation within families is 8.4%, and the recidivism rate
for rape is 18.9%); see also id. at 2 (quoting DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND
CORRECTION, STATE OF OHIO, TEN YEAR RECIDIVISM FOLLOW-UP OF 1989 SEX
OFFENDER RELEASES 12 (2001)):
Certainly any instance of sexual recidivism is cause for concern,
and we should not lose sight that even a 1% sexual recidivism rate
represents a certain number of victims of sexual assault. However,
there is a rather widespread misconception that sex offenders, as a
whole, are repeat offenders. While this study is obviously unable
to determine the actual rate of reoffense, it is clear that a sex
offender returning to an Ohio prison for a new offense is a fairly
unusual occurrence.
Compared to other recidivism rates—79% for stealing motor vehicles and 77% for
possession of stolen property—sexual recidivism is extremely low. See LOTKE,
supra note 3, at 3; see also NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 2 (noting that on
average the “recidivism rates for all types of sex offenders are lower than for other
offenders”).
72
See LOTKE, supra note 3, at 1.
73
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006).
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Megan’s Law requiring states to make sex offender registries available
to the public.74 Following the lead of Congress, states began passing
similar legislation.75 All fifty of the states have registration
requirements and make the registries available to the public.76
Seventeen states have civil commitment statutes for “sexually violent
predators.”77 These statutes require that a sex offender who has been
adjudicated a “sexually violent predator” be committed to a medical
facility after completion of his criminal sentence.78
Further, local legislatures have begun passing distance marker
legislation and child safety zone legislation.79 Distance marker
legislation provides that sex offenders cannot reside within a certain
distance of schools, daycare centers, or any other places where
children gather.80 Child safety zone legislation provides that a sex
offender may not loiter within certain feet of areas where children may
congregate.81 The Michigan City Parks and Recreation Board’s
ordinance banning Mr. Brown from all Michigan City parks is the
logical extension of the general trend in sex offender legislation.82 It
74

42 U.S.C. § 14071(e); see also NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 2.
See, e.g., Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003); Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
76
NIETO & JUNG, supra 66, at 8-9.
77
Id. at 3.
78
Id.
79
See id.; see also Whitnell supra note 5 (noting that some localities have also
begun creating Zoning Dispersal legislation which limit the number of sex offenders
who may live in the same residential dwelling).
80
See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 3 (noting that 22 states have enacted
some form of distance marker legislation, ranging from 500 feet to 2,500 feet). In
Illinois a child sex offender cannot reside within 500 feet of a school or school
property. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(b-5) (2006). In Indiana, a violent sex
offender cannot reside within 1,000 feet of any school property for the duration of
parole. IND. CODE § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B)(2006). Wisconsin does not have a sex
offender residency restriction law.
81
See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 15 (Typical distance is 300 ft. No
reported court decisions affecting Child Safety Zone legislation, but two courts have
upheld band from city parks).
82
See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720 (7th Cir 2006).
75
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demonstrates how sex offender legislation has narrowed from the
general to the specific and how sex offender legislation has the ability
to strip sex offenders of their rights.83

D. Constitutional Challenges
Before the United States Supreme Court, the laws directed against
sex offenders have experienced constitutional challenges from various
fronts.84 Sex offender laws have been attacked on various bases
including violating the First Amendment, the ex post facto clause, and
double jeopardy.85 Under each challenge, state and federal courts have
upheld legislation directed at sex offenders.86
Regardless of whether there has been a violation or not, the Court
has held that the laws directed against sex offenders pass rational basis
review; the laws are deemed are rational means to the legitimate goal
of protecting children.87 The Court, finding that no violation has
occurred under any of these theories, applies the less stringent rational
basis review.88 Under this standard, each of these laws passes muster.89
For example, “residency restrictions do not offend the equal protection
clause. They represent a rational legislative determination that
excluding sex offenders from areas where children congregate will
advance the state’s interest in protecting children.”90

83

Id.
See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 43.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2003); McKune v. Lile, 536
U.S. 24, 48 (2002).
88
See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03; McKune, 536 U.S. at 48.
89
See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03; McKune, 536 U.S. at 48.
90
NIETO & JUNG, supra note 66, at 44.
84
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1. The Supreme Court
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court upheld the civil
commitment of a sexually violent predator under the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act.91 The Act which intended to prevent recidivism,
established a procedure to civilly commit for long term care a sex
offender who is deemed to be a “sexually violent predator.”92
Specifically, in Kansas, Hendricks sought to prevent the state from
committing him as sexually violent predator after he had served his
prison sentence.93 The Court found that the act did not violate the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, the ban on ex post
facto lawmaking, or due process.94 In addressing the substantive due
process argument, the Court noted that although freedom from
physical restraint is a core liberty interest, an “involuntary civil
confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous persons” is not
contrary to the understanding of ordered liberty.95 Further, because the
Act entails civil commitment proceedings, it is non-punitive and
therefore does not violate double jeopardy or the ex post facto clause.96
In 2000, the Supreme Court revisited the alleged punitive nature of
civil commitment legislation.97 It found Washington’s Community
Protection Act98 constitutional as the statute was civil rather than
criminal.99 The Court, expanding its holding in Kansas v. Hendricks,
held that a civil commitment of a sexually violent predator is
constitutional both facially and as applied.100

91

521 U.S. 346, 350-53 (1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. (1994).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a01 et seq. (1994).
93
Kansas, 521 U.S. at 354.
94
Id. at 371.
95
Id. at 357.
96
Id. at 369.
97
See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
98
Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 et seq. (1992).
99
Seling, 531 U.S at 260-61.
100
Id. at 267.
92
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In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld the Alaska Sex Offender
Registration Act.101 The Act which requires registration and
community notification was criticized as constituting retroactive
punishment.102 The Court reasoned that the Alaska law is not punitive,
and thus does not violate the ex post facto clause.103 However, a
dissenting Justice Stevens noted that proper analysis would have
included asking whether the registration statue affects a protected
liberty interest.104
Similarly, in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the
Court upheld Connecticut’s Megan’s Law on procedural due process
grounds.105 It held that states are permitted to classify all sex offenders
as a group and require registration and notification.106 Here, the Court
did not address substantive due process, but Justice Scalia’s
concurrence suggests that there is the possibility that such a claim may
be successful.107 Justice Scalia noted: “Absent a claim . . . that the
liberty interest in question is so fundamental as to implicate so-called
‘substantive’ due process, a properly enacted law can eliminate it.”108
Accordingly, as there was no claim that this violated substantive due
process, the law was held constitutional.109
These cases dealing with sex offender legislation decided by the
Supreme Court demonstrate the Court’s trend to uphold sex offender
legislation against attacks on various constitutional fronts.110 These
101

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 85 (2003); Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010(a), (b)

(2000).
102

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
Id. at 105-06.
104
Id. at 111-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding both that a protected liberty
interest as involved and that registration and notification requirements are punitive).
105
Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 54-251, 54-252, 54-254 (2001).
106
Conn., 538 U.S. at 8.
107
See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn., 538 U.S. 1; Seling v. Young,
531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
103

130
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cases also demonstrate that substantive due process may be the only
successful claim available.111
2. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has also established a line of precedent
upholding claims against sex offender laws.112 Further, the Seventh
Circuit has specifically addressed the issue of a regulation specifically
banning a sex offender from a public park.113
In 2003, in Doe v. Lafayette, a Seventh Circuit panel held that
banning sex offenders from a public park violates the First
Amendment because it punishes a person for his thoughts.114 In
comparing the sex offender to other criminals, the court noted:
[W]e would not sanction criminal punishment of an
individual with a criminal history of bank robbery (a
crime, like child molestation, with a high rate of
recidivism . . .) simply because she or he stood in the
parking lot of a bank and thought about robbing
it. . . . [Further,] punishment of a drug addict who
stands outside a dealer’s house craving a hit but
successfully resists the urge to enter and purchase drugs
would be offensive to our understanding of the bounds
of the criminal law.115

111

See Conn., 538 U.S. at 8.
See, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette (Lafayette II), 377 F.3d 757, 774 (7th.
Cir. 2004) (rejecting petitioner’s challenges based on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.).
113
Doe v. City of Lafayette (Lafayette I), 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), rev’d
on reh’g en banc, Lafayette II, 377 F.3d 757.
114
334 F.3d at 613.
115
Id. at 612.
112
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However, in 2004, on rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the panel’s decision by holding that the park ban does not violate
either the First Amendment or Due Process.116
In Doe v. Lafayette, Doe, a convicted sex offender, was banned
from all public parks in Lafayette, Indiana.117 Doe had a long history
of arrests and crimes for sexual offenses directed towards children.118
The act that precipitated the ban was Doe’s “cruising” the parks and
watching children, actions that were brought to the attention of the
Lafayette Police Department.119 Doe admits that he went to a public
park, and upon seeing some children, felt that he should leave before
he did anything.120 In his own words, Doe stated regarding the
occurrence:
When I saw the three, the four kids there, my thoughts
were thoughts I had before when I see children,
possibly expose myself to them, I thought of the
possibility of, you know, having some kind of sexual
contact with the kids, but I know with four kids there,
that’s pretty difficult to do. It’s a wide open area. Those
thoughts were there, but they, you know, weren’t
realistic at the time. They were just thoughts.121
Subsequently, the superintendent of the Lafayette Parks and
Recreation Department sent a letter to Doe informing him that he was
prohibited from entering any of the City’s parks.122
The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Doe was not being
punished for his impure thoughts in violation of the First

116

Lafayette II, 377 F.3d at 758.
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 759.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 760 (quoting Doe’s deposition testimony).
122
Id.

117
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Amendment.123 The court reasoned that the City did not ban Doe from
the parks for having these thoughts; rather, the City banned him
because these were not mere thoughts because he was on the brink of
acting on these thoughts.124 The court also held that Doe was not being
deprived a fundamental right, because his right to enter the parks is not
“fundamental.”125 The court relied on the same reasoning it applied in
Brown v. Michigan.126 The court emphasized the narrowness of
fundamental rights and presented an exhaustive list of those rights
which have been deemed fundamental.127 The Seventh Circuit
continued stating:
By banning Mr. Doe from the parks, the City only has
deprived him of the “right” to go to the City’s parks
which he wishes to use for allegedly innocent,
recreational purposes. That this right is not
“fundamental” to Mr. Doe’s personhood is readily
apparent not only from a comparison to other
“fundamental” rights, but also from the fact that Mr.
Doe has not even entered the City’s parks since at least
1990.128
Finding that the City had violated neither the First nor Fourteenth
Amendments, the court applied the rational basis standard to review
the City’s ban.129 The banning of a sex offender from entering a public
park is rationally related to the interest in protecting children.130
Further, the court alluded that this ban would also pass the higher
standard of strict scrutiny because the interest in protecting children is
123

Id. at 766.
Id. at 767.
125
Id. at 770.
126
See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 732 (7th Cir. 2006).
127
Lafayette II, 377 F.3d at 770-71.
128
Id. at 771.
129
Id. at 773.
130
See id.
124
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compelling, and the ban of one sex offender based on his near relapse
is narrowly tailored.131
More recently, the Seventh Circuit in Harris v. Donahue
remanded a prison inmate case where the Department of Prisons
banned minor children from visiting sex offender parents.132 The court
recognized that there is a cause of action as to whether this ban
violates a due process liberty interest to associate with your own kids
but offered no opinion as to whether it would be successful.133
The Seventh Circuit has been less consistent than the Supreme
Court in regards to legislation directed against sex offenders; in some
decisions it has demonstrated their unconstitutionality and in others it
has emphasized the possibility for successful claims.134 However, as
with the Supreme Court, precedent still holds that these laws will be
held constitutional under the rational basis standard of review.135
II. ANALYSIS OF BROWN V. MICHIGAN CITY
Although precedent demonstrates that claims against sex offender
legislation have been almost universally unsuccessful, it is less clear
whether a court would view such regulations as a deprivation of
rights.136 Precedent has left the door open to whether there can be a
successful substantive due process challenge.137 In Brown, the Seventh
Circuit closes this door.138 Technically, the Seventh Circuit remains
true to both its own precedent as well as the general trend of Supreme

131

Id. at 773-74.
Harris v. Donahue, 175 Fed. Appx. 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2006).
133
Id.
134
See id; Doe v. City of Lafayette (Lafayette I), 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003),
rev’d on reh’g en banc, Lafayette II, 377 F.3d 757.
135
See Lafayette II, 377 F.3d 757.
136
See, e.g., id. at 770-71; Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
137
See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)
138
Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 732 (7th Cir. 2006).
132

134
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Court precedent.139 However, it fails to look at other factors and seems
to be focused on obtaining the “popular” outcome.
A. Brown v. Michigan City: Sex offenders do not have a property
interest in visiting and enjoying a public park.
In Brown v. Michigan, the court rejected the argument that Mr.
Brown had a fundamental right to enter and enjoy the parks in
Michigan City, Indiana.140 The court reasoned that an individual must
have a legitimate claim of entitlement in order to claim a property
interest and that Mr. Brown did not have a legitimate expectation of
enjoying a city park, even though admission to the park is free to
Michigan City residents and even though Mr. Brown had a history and
practice of entering and enjoying Washington Park.141
It is widely accepted that a fundamental right is a right which is
deeply rooted in this “[n]ation’s history, legal traditions, and
practices.”142 To state that the openness of public parks is not deeply
rooted in our history, legal traditions, and practices is a difficult
proposition to make.143 Since this nation’s inception, tracts of land
have been held in trust for public use and public enjoyment.144 Legal
analysis and tradition rely upon the openness of parks:145
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
139

See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003); Conn., 538 U.S. 1; Seling, 531 U.S.
250; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
140
Brown, 462 F.3d at 732-33.
141
Id. at 732.
142
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
143
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
144
See 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006).
145
See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16.

135

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/5

20

Caplis: Got Rights? Not if You’re a Sex Offender in the Seventh Circuit

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.
Specifically, First Amendment forum analysis relies on the concept
that parks are open, making “streets and parks” the paradigmatic
location for free expression.146 And in practice parks are held open to
the public; the general public cannot be excluded from a park for an
unreasonable duration147 and a particular class of persons cannot
arbitrarily be excluded from entering and enjoying a public park.148
Further, in City of Chicago v. Morales, a plurality of the Court
stated that there is a fundamental right to loiter in a public place.149 In
determining the constitutionality of the city of Chicago’s gang
loitering ordinance, it noted that “an individual’s decision to remain in
a public place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the
freedom of movement inside frontiers that is ‘a part of our
heritage.’”150 The plurality thus stated that “the freedom to loiter for
innocent purposes is part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”151 The Supreme Court has also
held that there is a fundamental interest in interstate travel, but it is

146

See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). In the public forum, speech may be regulated, but
it may be abridged or denied. Hague, 307 U.S. at 516.
147
64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006) (citing Nebraska City v.
Nebraska City Speed & Fair Ass’n, 186 N.W. 374 (Neb. 1922); Sherburne v. City of
Portsmouth, 58 A. 38 (N.H. 1904)).
148
64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006) (citing Blackman Health
Resort v. City of Atlanta, 151 S.E. 525 (Ga. 1921)).
149
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999); but see id. at 83
(Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 98 (stating that there is no constitutional right to loiter).
150
City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 54 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126
(1958)).
151
City of Chicago, 527 U.S. at 53.
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unclear whether there is a comparable interest in intrastate travel and
whether entering a public park would constitute intrastate travel.152
The Seventh Circuit’s narrow construction of what is a
fundamental right fails to analyze all the relevant factors; it fails to
examine the history and openness of parks, the importance of parks in
legal doctrine, and the general freedoms to travel and loiter.153 The
right to enter a park does not fit into any of the pigeon-holed rights
that the Supreme Court has deemed fundamental.154 However, like
these rights, there is a history, tradition, and practice of opening parks
to the public.155 Further the right to loiter and the right to travel
support that argument that there may be a right, or at least an interest
in access to public parks.156
Additionally, in Doe v. Lafayette, the Seventh Circuit analyzed
whether the right to enter the parks was fundamental to the
individual.157 It determined that because Doe had not entered the parks
in over twelve years, his personhood was not implicated.158 This is
factually distinct from the situation in Brown.159 Mr. Brown had been
entering and enjoying the parks for over fifteen years.160 Not only did
he go to Washington Park as part of his daily schedule, but he enjoyed
152

See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1974)
(reasoning that there is a right to intrastate travel); but see Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1993) (commenting that there is not a
fundamental right to intrastate travel).
153
See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 732-33 (7th Cir. 2006)
154
See id. at 732.
155
See 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1557 (2006); see also Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
156
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999); Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1974).
157
Doe v. Lafayette (“Lafayette II”), 377 F.3d 757, 771 (7th Cir. 2004)
(reasoning that the right to enter a park “is not ‘fundamental’ to Mr. Doe’s
personhood . . . from the fact that Mr. Doe has not even entered the City’s parks
since at least 1990”)
158
Id.
159
See Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2006).
160
Id.
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the park for other purposes such as fishing, boating, and picnicking.161
Unlike Doe, Mr. Brown’s personhood was implicated by the ban.162
These cases and the facts present in Brown v. Michigan City
demonstrate that an argument can be made that a fundamental interest
or right has been implicated.163 However, the Seventh Circuit brushes
aside this case law and these factual distinctions and decides the case
as if the ban against Mr. Brown was no different than any other
restriction against a sex offender.164
B. Brown v. Michigan City: Sex offenders do not have a liberty interest
in protecting their reputation.
The Seventh Circuit also rejected Mr. Brown’s claim that
Michigan City infringed upon his liberty interest in his reputation by
classifying him as a “present threat” to children in the ordinance.165 In
doing so, the court relied on the test created in Paul v. Davis.166 There,
the Supreme Court held that mere injury to reputation alone does not
deprive an individual of a liberty interest.167 In order to successfully
claim that one is deprived of a liberty interest, the claimant must show
not only that his reputation was harmed but also that his legal status
has been altered as well.168
Mr. Brown is a sex offender and based upon general sex offender
registration and notification laws, Mr. Brown will always be known as

161

Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 5, Brown v. Michigan City, No. 05-3912
(7th Cir. Sept. 5th, 2006).
162
Compare Brown, 462 F.3d at 722, with Lafayette II, 377 F.3d at 771.
163
See Brown, 462 F.3d 720; City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53
(1999); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1974); Hague
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
164
Brown, 462 F.3d at 732-34.
165
Id. at 729-30.
166
Id. at 730.
167
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976).
168
Id.
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a sex offender.169 According to the law of Indiana, he has a reporting
duty for life.170 His name, address, photograph, physical description,
and crime are readily available for anyone to view.171 The legislation
in this case is different.172 This is special legislation directed at Mr.
Brown in his individual capacity.173 The Park Board had given him a
different status than other sex offenders.174 Not only must he comply
with all other city, county, state, and federal laws, but Mr. Brown must
also comply with a park ordinance which bans him from all city
parks.175 This is an alteration of his legal status.176 He has lost a right
that every other citizen and every other sex offender in Michigan City
still holds.177 Additionally beyond this altered status, Mr. Brown is
also known as a “present threat.”178
The facts in this case may satisfy the requirements of Paul v.
Davis179; however, the Seventh Circuit was quick to come to the
decision that Mr. Brown did not have an altered status and that he was
not denied a right.180 This is another example of how leniently sex
169

See IND. CODE 11-8-8-7 (2006); see also Offender Detail for Robert Eugene
Brown, Indiana Sheriffs’ Sex Offender Registry,
http://www.insor.org/insasoweb/details.do?sid=339457.011 (last visited December 5,
2006).
170
See IND. CODE 11-8-8-7.
171
Id.
172
Reporting and residency restrictions apply to all sex offenders, whereas this
ordinance applies solely to Mr. Brown.
173
See Brown, 462 F.3d at 726. Special legislation is legislation directed a
particular person or class, as opposed to the general public. BARRON’S LAW
DICTIONARY (2003). Special legislation is valid as long as it comports with the
Constitution, specifically the 14th Amendment. Id. Special legislation must pass
rational basis review. Id.
174
See Brown, 462 F.3d at 725.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 729.
179
See 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976).
180
Brown, 462 F.3d at 730.
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offender legislation is reviewed, allowing rights of a whole class of
people, and in some cases an individual, to be stripped away.
C. Brown v. Michigan City: Rational Basis Review
In Brown v. Michigan City the court, having found no
constitutional violation, reviewed the park ordinance under the rational
basis standard of review.181 According to this standard, the government
interest must be legitimate and the means employed to meet that end
must be rational.182 Under this deferential standard it is easy to see
why sex offender laws pass constitutional muster.183 The Michigan
City Park Board has a legitimate reason for keeping Mr. Brown out of
the parks.184 He is a convicted sex offender, specifically a child
molester, who frequently visits a park where children are present.185
The legitimate reason is the interest in protecting children from a sex
offender.186 The means to that end is also rational; the City is
preventing one known child molester from entering a park where
children are present.187
However, it would not be as easy for sex offender legislation to be
found constitutional if the courts applied a higher standard of scrutiny,
such as strict scrutiny.188 For strict scrutiny there needs to be a
compelling governmental interest and means narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.189 Any municipality can argue that the protection of
children and other victims is a compelling interest, but a court must

181

Id. at 733.
Id.
183
See id. at 733-34 (noting that children are vulnerable members of society
which the City must shield from sexual abuse).
184
Id. at 734.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
189
Id.
182
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determine whether that interest is served by the law and whether that
law is narrowly tailored.190
Strict scrutiny should be applied to the park ordinance. It should
be applied because the ordinance deals with a fundamental property
right to access a public park and a fundamental liberty interest in one’s
reputation.191 Alternatively, it should also be applied because this
ordinance is based upon a suspect classification: a prior sex offense.192
Sex offenders, based on registration and notification, are an easily
identifiable group with little political power.193 On the other hand
those that legislate against sex offenders have the power of the public
behind them.194 A heightened protection is necessary to ensure the
validity of laws against sex offenders.195 Accordingly, because of the
implication of fundamental rights and the classification of sex
offender, strict scrutiny is necessary to judge the park ordinance.196 In
Brown the ordinance is narrowly tailored because the Park Board
modified its ordinance after the commencement of the litigation to
only affect Mr. Brown.197 It is less clear whether this ordinance
actually serves its purpose.198 Thus, this ordinance may not pass strict
scrutiny review because although it is narrowly tailored, and although
there is a compelling interest, there is no obvious nexus or evidence as
to whether the children in the Michigan City parks are safer because
one convicted sex offender is no longer permitted to enter the parks.

190

Id.
See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815 (2006).
192
See id.
193
Bret R. Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep
Convicted Sex Offenders Away From Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 987 (2006)
(citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803)).
194
See id. at 987-88.
195
Id.
196
See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 815.
197
Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2006).
198
See id. If the purpose to protect children, the banning of one particular sex
offender as opposed to all sex offender seems to not serve the purpose. See also
Whitnell, supra note 5.
191
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D. What rights should sex offenders be entitled to?
Sex offenders rest in a gray area of civil rights. Registration and
required public access make sex offenders an easily identifiable
group.199 Distance marker legislation and child safety zone legislation
are quickly limiting where convicted sex offenders may live, work,
and even loiter.200 Sexually violent predator acts commit sex offenders
even after their sentence has been served.201 All of these laws place
restrictions upon sex offenders after they have served their sentence,
and place heavy restrictions upon sex offenders as they re-enter
society.202 Upon re-entrance, they have neither the rights of an
imprisoned individual nor the rights of an ordinary citizen.203
Brown v. Michigan City represents, yet another law which restricts
the liberty of a sex offender and strips away a sex offender’s rights.204
The Seventh Circuit responded to the question of whether sex
offenders have rights in the negative.205 This decision allows a piece of
special legislation by a municipality to ban one individual from
entering the public parks.206 It stands for the proposition that a sex
offender does not have the right of access or enjoyment to a public
space because of his past crime.207 This may lead to a slippery
slope.208 Here, Mr. Brown is not allowed in the park because he is a
threat to children, but what is there to stop possible future legislation
which may ban a sex offender from a library, museum, etc., because
children may be present.209 Brown also stands for the proposition that a
199

See NIETO, supra note 66 at 8-9.
See id. at 3; see also Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
201
See NIETO, supra note 66 at 3; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346.
202
See Whitnell, supra note 5.
203
See Hobson, supra note 193 at 988.
204
Brown v. Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2006).
205
Id. at 734.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See id.
209
Id.
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sex offender’s liberty interest is not implicated when a legislating body
creates a tailored piece of legislation which not only names and
identifies a particular person, but calls him a “present threat.”210
Sex offenders are a class of individuals who are an easy target for
legislation.211 However, the judiciary cannot in good faith strictly
uphold each and every act, law, or ordinance directed against sex
offenders.212 Although the majority of the population may approve of
sex offender laws and although at the core of the law there may be a
rational basis, the judiciary still has a constitutional duty to protect
citizens from the “tyranny of the majority.”213 It can be argued that:
Justices betray their duty of judicial review when they
turn substantive due process analysis into a mere
academic exercise, placing a few defined pigeonholes
of fundamental rights on one side that receive strict
scrutiny protection from legislative threats and
relegating everything else to a second side that triggers
only highly deferential review. If courts blindly apply
rational basis review whenever the threatened right is
deemed less than fundamental, even the most severe,
unfair restraint may survive.214
In the realm of sex offender laws, whether the claim is based on
fundamental rights or other punitive challenges, the courts have
continually found no violation and the ordinance always passes the
deferential review granted.215 But, a heightened standard is necessary
to justify certain regulations against sex offenders because sex
offenders resemble a discrete and insular minority with no political
210

Id.
Whitnell, supra note 5.
212
See Hobson, supra note 193 at 988.
213
Id. at 989.
214
Id. at 988.
215
See, e.g., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Doe v. City of Lafayette,
377 F.3d 757, 770- 71 (7th Cir. 2004).
211
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power and because sex offender laws substantially restrict where a sex
offender may live, work, and loiter.216
CONCLUSION
Focusing solely on the general trend, the Seventh Circuit
conformed to precedent. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh
Circuit has struck down a piece of sex offender legislation based on a
constitutional challenge. However, this is not good policy. Although
sex offenders may be a serious threat to society, the judiciary cannot
base their decisions solely on the status of the individual. Sex offender
legislation punishes those who have already fulfilled their sentence. It
is upon their re-entrance to society that legislation restricts their
freedoms. To restrict them solely based on their status punishes them
twice for the same crime.
Specifically, in the case of Brown v. Michigan City, the Seventh
Circuit had the opportunity to decide about the rights of Mr. Brown
without looking at the outcome. There is no Supreme Court precedent
as to whether child safety zone legislation is constitutional or whether
banning an individual from a park is constitutional and the facts of the
case are distinguishable from that of the Doe v. Lafayette. Further, in
regards to Mr. Brown’s liberty interest in his reputation, this ordinance
was specifically tailored to him and identified him as a present threat
to children. It resulted in a change of status that could satisfy the test
propounded in Paul v. Davis. And finally, the court glossed over this
analysis and found this ordinance to pass rational basis review.
According to this precedent, as established by the Seventh Circuit,
sex offenders do not have the rights of a citizen. Sex offenders only
have rights which are left to them after legislation is done with them.
Currently, they do not have the right to remain anonymous, the right to
live where they choose, the right to loiter where they choose, and
possibly the right to enter a public park. As legislation against sex
offenders continues its growth it is unclear what rights sex offenders
will be left with.
216
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In order to protect this “unpopular” group, the judiciary must not
follow the tyranny of the majority. The Seventh Circuit and other
courts must make reasoned decisions based on the law, not the
outcome and apply a stricter standard of review when the fundamental
rights of an unpopular group are slowly being stripped away.
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